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Abstract
This paper shows that if moral hazard leads to credit rationing, an appropriate usury law
must raise social welfare. Under market clearing, a usury law is always beneficial if funds are
inelastically supplied. When entrepreneurial heterogeneity is introduced, an improvement
arises even when the supply of funds is elastic. These results apply also in costly state-
verification models and diversionary models of the credit market. Finally, a usury law proves
useful in eliminating low-yielding projects when some entrepreneurs display excess
optimism.
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11. Introduction.
 With the surprising exception of Adam Smith, the consensus amongst economists is
that usury laws are “...mischievous interferences with the spontaneous course of industrial
transaction … originated in a religious prejudice against receiving interest on money” (J.S.
Mill, 1891). Nevertheless, as Homer and Sylla (1991) document, throughout history interest
rate ceilings have been the norm and are still surprisingly widespread. Amongst non-
economists, the debate over the merits of interest rate caps remains lively. As the Economist
recently reported, the boom in a new form of consumer finance, pay-day lenders, who cash
a check issued by the consumer on proof of  a regular job “…has caused an uproar
among advocates for the poor. The Consumer Federation of America calls the
practice ‘legal loan sharking’.” (Consumer finance pay dirt, 5-June, 1999). The credit
industry stands accused of misleading the consumers about the true cost of these loans,
which often imply APRs of more than 500%. Such high interest rate loans are prohibited in
nineteen USA states as a result of longstanding usury laws. Free-market advocates argue
that those harmed most are the very people for whom the regulation is in place; risky
(predominately poor) borrowers will simply be denied credit when the ceiling interest rate is
insufficient to cover their credit risk. Even so, anti-usury legislation has proved remarkably
resistant to criticisms repeal attempts. In Arkansas, one of the states with the strictest
regulations, twice in the last decade credit-industry backed referenda have rejected repeal
by large majorities. (Usury laws, the bad side of town,  The Economist, 28 Nov. 1998).
In this paper we discuss some possible reasons why usury laws may be efficient.
Two lines of argument are pursued. The first observes that high interest rates induce moral
hazard in borrowers and hence may involve significant deadweight costs in transferring
income from debtors to creditors. In the presence of credit rationing, the marginal
deadweight cost is infinite so, under any concave social welfare function, putting a cap on
interest rates is beneficial. We explore this idea in a variety of credit rationing and market
clearing settings.
The second theme we pursue involves self-selection arguments. We consider
systematic reasons why marginal borrowers, i.e. those least willing to pay high interest rates,
2could nevertheless be the highest quality from a social perspective. Excluding the keenest
borrowers from credit is then directly beneficial if their use of funds entails a social loss, or
indirectly advantageous through their replacement by those with higher social but lower
private benefits. As we show, this is exactly what happens when, as the evidence suggests,
some entrepreneurs are optimistically biased concerning their projects’ prospects.
Section 2 surveys the economics literature on usury laws. Section 3 presents a
standard moral-hazard model and demonstrates that when the equilibrium is characterized
by rationing, or if the market clears but the supply of funds is inelastic, an appropriate
interest rate ceiling must increase welfare. In Section 4, we introduce entrepreneurial
heterogeneity in a moral-hazard setting. We find that usury laws then increase welfare under
market clearing, even when the supply of funds is elastic. Section 5 extends the result to
costly-state verification and diversionary models. Finally, Section 6 introduces unrealistically
optimistic entrepreneurial expectations. Doing so provides a possible framework in which to
rationalize Adam Smith’s otherwise puzzling views and a strong argument for usury laws
themselves.
2. Economic perspectives on usury laws.
Since the birth of the discipline economists have debated the merits of usury laws.
The most notable controversy was between Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham.
Interestingly, the inventor of the metaphor of the invisible hand did not feel that its reach
extended to the credit market. He tackled the issue in a famous passage of the “Wealth of
the Nations” where he argued that, were it possible to charge high interest rates, most funds
“....would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this
high interest. Sober people ... would not venture into the competition.“
This passage can be read as envisaging an adverse selection effect of high interest
rates on loan quality. The problem with this interpretation is that Smith does not spell out the
reason why sober people would drop out first, why lenders fail to recognize this adverse
3selection effect and of their own volition curb the interest rate below the market clearing
level, and indeed why lending to prodigals and projectors should be socially undesirable.
Bentham (1790), engaged in a battle against usury laws, was naturally disappointed by the
views of his fellow liberal. He argued that usury laws were not efficacious in preventing
profligacy. Prodigals would be granted credit even at low interest rates if able to offer
security. Moreover, according to Bentham, it is innovators (Smith’s projectors), rather than
traders engaged in established activities, that are responsible for advancement in conditions
from one era to the next. By their very nature, innovative trades involve high risk and
therefore can only be funded at high interest rates. Limiting the allowed interest rate would
therefore stall the engine of growth. Finally, usury laws harm borrowers by limiting their
access to legal credit. Funds may be available if the law is evaded, but in this case lenders
will require a premium for the additional risk due to illegal trading. Underlying all these
arguments was Bentham’s belief in the virtues of contractual freedom:
“My neighborours, being at liberty, have happened to concur among
themselves in dealing at a certain rate of interest. I, who have money to lend , and
Titus, who wants to borrow it of me, would be glad, the one of us to accept, the other
to give, an interest somewhat higher than theirs: Why is the liberty they exercise to be
made a pretence for depriving me and Titus of ours”.
J. Bentham “In defence of usury”
Over the following century and beyond, Bentham’s liberal view came to be
considered the established orthodoxy in the profession.  Chapter X of John Stuart Mill's
‘Principles’ (1891), for example, files usury laws under the heading  “Of interferences of
government grounded on erroneous theories” with the existence of usury laws in most legal
system being explained by irrational (religious) beliefs. The scope for such regulations was
confined to the protection of the borrower in non-developed societies where credit is not
generally available (Marshall, 1920).
A major challenge to this established orthodoxy came from Keynes’ General
Theory (1936). Keynes’ view was that the interest rate, being an essentially monetary
4phenomenon with potentially vast real effects, could and should be manipulated in order to
increase investment. In his opinion,
“…the rate of interest, unless it is curbed by every instrument at the disposal of
society, would rise too high to permit an adequate inducement to investment.”
Keynes, J.M., General Theory, Book VI, Chap. 23.
As long as funds are available, a usury laws counters the tendency to inadequate investment
by lowering the hurdle rate sought by investors. Of course, as Blitz and Long (1968) point
out, whether a usury law increases or decreases investment depends not only on willingness
to invest but also on the supply of funds. As the short side of the market determines the level
of transactions, a simple partial equilibrium analysis suggests that at best, the quantity of
funds traded in the credit market would be unaltered if the supply of funds is inelastic.
Steeped in Marshallian economics, Keynes would have been well aware of this argument,
but in his general equilibrium system with unemployment, the result is not so clear-cut.
Greater investment demand generates the higher income that brings about extra savings. The
problem is that at the regulated interest rate there is excess demand for money balances and
excess supply of the bonds issued to finance the extra investment. If, as seems reasonable,
bonds are the best substitute for cash balances, the story ends with the usual multiplier
expansion in income. If, alternatively, the frustrated demand for cash balances spills into
increased consumption, this boosts output yet more. 1. Keynes' position is certainly
defensible.
Subsequent literature has ignored unemployment and focused on the substitution
effects of usury laws inducing credit rationing both in the form of quantity rationing (see for
example Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969) and redlining of the most risky types (Blitz and Long,
1968). In these cases, rationing, is associated with a diminished availability of credit. Keeton
(1979) however points out that, for non-Keynsian reasons, a usury law may even increase
the quantity of funds traded in the credit market. When the bank bears a fixed cost for each
                                                
1 For a single country in a world of perfect capital mobility the process fails, and even if capital is somewhat
immobile, the dynamics is delicate
5loan granted, it may "force" borrowers to accept larger-than-desired loans. An interest rate
ceiling may further increase the value of the loan required by the bank.
Another strand of literature attempts to explain the pervasiveness of anti-usury
regulation throughout economic history. Blitz and Long (1968) find that usury laws benefit
prime borrowers, who profit both from lower interest rates and from diminished competition
due to the exclusion of high-risk borrowers from the market. Following this line of argument,
Ekelund et al (1989) adopt a public choice approach and argue that usury laws were due
to the influence of large institutional borrowers, and specifically of the Church. However, the
pervasiveness of this type of regulation seems to suggest that usury laws counteract some
genuine market failure. Were they solely the result of such rent-seeking activity, it is
necessary to believe that, throughout history, the prime borrowers have almost always been
more influential than other borrowers and lenders. Ordover and Weiss (1981) build an
argument for a positive welfare effect based on the existence of uninformed borrowers and
search costs. In this case the unregulated equilibrium may well entail some banks charging
inefficiently high rates. Finally, Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) take a Rawlsian approach
and suggest that usury laws perform a social insurance role against adverse idiosyncratic
transitory income shocks. They demonstrate that such a policy is a rough but effective tool
for transferring resources from good states to bad states of the world whenever the elasticity
of savings to the interest rate is sufficiently low. Evidence is the fact that interest rate ceilings
tend to be lower in societies with high wealth inequality but a relatively stable composition.
Even if not unlawful, the moral opprobrium that frequently attaches to "unconscionable"
interest rates may also reflect these concerns. There is room for debate though to what
extent usury laws are a better device than the more natural alternatives, direct social
insurance and redistributive policies.
Empirical investigation of the effects of usury laws has focused on two issues: the
effects on the overall amount of lending and on the distribution of funds among borrowers
with differing riskiness. All studies to address the issue (Goudzwaard, 1968, Shay, 1970,
Greer, 1974) find that the degree of riskiness of bank lending is strongly positively
correlated with the height of the ceiling interest rate. Therefore, high-risk borrowers are less
likely to obtain a loan when the usury ceiling is lower. A further but improper inference
6drawn by some authors, based on the simple competitive model, is that total lending must
also be correlated with the height of the ceiling rate. The direct evidence on this point is
actually mixed.2 Crafton (1980) finds a positive correlation, Shay (1970) finds that the
volume of loans is not affected by the ceiling, Greer (1974) finds that the correlation is
positive for low levels of the ceiling and becomes negative at high levels (above 27%), while
Kawaja’s  (1969) data set displays a negative correlation. Analyses of loan rejection rates
deliver a similarly ambiguous picture. Goudzwaard (1968b) finds that rejection rates are
uncorrelated with the height of the ceiling rate, while Greer (1975) finds a negative
correlation.
3. Moral Hazard.
Moral hazard effects provide a simple and appealing case for usury laws. Whenever
the interest rate has an adverse incentive effect, thereby creating a deadweight loss, usury
laws may improve on the market equilibrium by reducing the effect of moral hazard. To
demonstrate this possibility we will use the simplest possible case of moral hazard. Suppose
there exists a population of N identical risk-neutral entrepreneurs, each one endowed with
an indivisible investment option, requiring a fixed amount of capital input K. For simplicity,
suppose that entrepreneurs own no wealth and therefore rely exclusively on the credit
market for funds. Projects succeed with probability p, and, in the event of success, yield a
gross return, S. Failure yields no revenue at all. The success probability of the project also
depends smoothly on the unverifiable effort, e, exerted by the entrepreneur. Project revenue
is also unverifiable and therefore a regular debt contract is the only feasible method of
finance3. Banks attract funds in a perfectly competitive deposit market. The supply of
                                                
2 Imperfect competition is the most straightforward explanation of why a maximum interest rate may increase
lending.
3 Assume that in the event of default the bank can seize all revenue and no renegotiation is possible. Then the
entrepreneur will only default in the event of failure.
7deposits, expressed in terms of the number of projects that can be funded  is n(I), where I is
the repayment on a deposit of K4, and n’³0.
With a regular debt contract and linearity of utility in income and effort, each
entrepreneur maximizes
Ue=p(e)(S-D)-e (1)
where  D is the repayment on loans.
Entrepreneurs’ choice of effort is determined by the condition
p’(e)(S-D)-1=0 (2)
with p¢(e)>0. The second order condition is satisfied provided that returns to effort are
decreasing (p²(e)<0). Since effort only increases the probability of success, p(e),
entrepreneurs are unable to capture the whole marginal return from effort  (p’S)  and so
exert even less effort than were they able to self finance. An increase in the repayment has a
negative effect on effort because it decreases the appropriability of the return from effort:
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From (3), it follows that the chance of default is increasing in D, and the bank return function
is not necessarily monotone increasing (as in Keeton, 1979, and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
The market equilibrium is either market clearing or rationing. Rationing occurs if, at *D ,
which maximises the banks’ expected return, when paid to depositors, attracts insufficient
funds to finance all entrepreneurs.
In assessing the effects of usury laws, our strategy is to evaluate the marginal
changes in agents’ welfare when the interest rate is capped just below the free market
equilibrium. We examine the rationing case first5.
Proposition 1: When moral hazard results in a rationing equilibrium, a usury law
marginally decreasing the interest rate below the market level increases any well-
behaved social welfare function.
                                                
4 Hence if we define i as the deposit interest rate, then I=(1+i)K.
5 A very similar analysis applies if entrepreneurs select project riskiness, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
8Proof. We must consider the effect of a usury law on all three types of agents in the
economy. By the competitive assumption we know that banks are constrained to zero-
profits and therefore that their surplus cannot be affected by the interest rate ceiling. We can
therefore restrict attention to the effects on borrowers’ and depositors’ welfare. Consider
borrowers first. Rationing requires that the banks’ expected return per-loan, M, reaches an
internal maximum, i.e. there exists a D* such that:
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Given (4), a sufficient condition for rationing is that at I*, such that I*=M(D*), available
funds are insufficient to serve all the entrepreneurs, that is n(I*)<N. In this case only a
proportion l=n(I*)/N of entrepreneurs is funded. The entrepreneur’s expected utility in this
equilibrium is:
Ue*= l[p(S-D*)-e*] (5)
A usury law that sets the allowed repayment marginally below D* benefits
borrowers if:
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The first term on the right hand side of (6) captures the change in the welfare of funded
entrepreneurs, keeping constant the probability of being funded. The square parenthesis is
zero from the entrepreneurs’ choice of effort, (2). The second term captures the welfare
variation consequent on the change in the number of loans the bank can grant. Since, in the
rationing equilibrium, the return function is at a maximum, 0=
dD
dM
, this term vanishes and
therefore
0-  
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Hence, at the equilibrium rationing interest rate, the borrowers’ welfare is decreasing in the
interest rate.
Next consider depositors. Their surplus equals the gross bank return, pDM =  as,
under competition, this whole return is simply transferred to depositors. From (4), a
9reduction in D has no effect M , so depositors bear no loss from a marginal lowering of the
interest rate.
 The impact of interest rate controls on borrowers and lenders is summarized by the
utility possibility frontier in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Utility Possibility Frontier (UPF).
The figure shows combinations of (expected) utilities for borrowers and depositors
as the repayment varies. At the turning point, utilities are those at the repayment, D*, that
maximizes the banks’ expected return per loan. Evidently, the social optimum will be
achieved at a repayment lower than D* for any “well-behaved” social welfare function.
QED.
 At first sight, a reduction in the interest rate affects depositors and borrowers in
opposite directions so an unambiguous welfare result is not possible. Depositors suffer
because, at a lower interest rate, the banks gain a lower return and therefore transfer back
to depositors a lower amount of revenues. In the rationing equilibrium however, the banks’
return is at a maximum and, by the envelope theorem, a marginal change in the interest rate
does not affect bank expected return and thus depositors welfare. A marginal decrease in D
Borrowers’ utility
Depositors’
utility
10
does though definitely benefit entrepreneurs. The overall efficiency gain arises because the
usury law dampens the distortion due to the incentive problem, and counteracts the
undersupply of effort 6. As a consequence, an infinitesimal reduction in the interest rate must
generate a Pareto gain. When we consider a discrete change in the interest rate, depositors’
welfare does decrease. However, due to the fact that the market equilibrium allocation is
Pareto dominated by that generated by an infinitesimally lower interest rate, for any smooth
concave social welfare function, the optimal interest rate is below the credit rationing level.
When market clearing occurs, the analysis is complicated by the fact that, contrary
to the equilibrium rationing case, depositors’ welfare is affected by infinitesimal changes in
the interest rate. Moreover, regulation now causes rationing to arise. We proceed by
adopting a utilitarian welfare function. Social welfare, W, is defined as the unweighted sum
of the utilities of all the agents in the economy.
Proposition 2: If the market clears and deposits are in fixed supply, a usury law
increases a utilitarian social welfare function.
We are interested in the direction of the change in W following a marginal reduction in D. If
n is the number of loans granted, then
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where 
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d  is the change in the aggregate surplus of depositors. Noting that under market
clearing, the initial equilibrium involves Nn = , from (1):
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)( IpDM ==  as the expected revenue from an individual loan,
                                                
6 Note that the envelope theorem implies that the volume of funds supplied is unchanged and therefore there is no
increase in rationing.
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 Since n depends on the supply of deposits and Bertrand competition implies I=M, so
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The relevant condition for a welfare improving usury law requires this expression to
be negative. Rearranging, the condition becomes:
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where enI is the elasticity of the supply of deposits with respect to the repayment to
depositors, I. The bracketed term in the numerator of the right hand side of (11)  is DP' so
is negative making the whole expression positive. It follows that each of the following is
sufficient for a usury law to be welfare increasing:
1)  The supply of funds in the deposit market is inelastic, enI=0;
2)  The return function is at a maximum, 
dM
dD
=0 (the rationing case).
The benefit of a usury law decreasing the interest rate below market level is that it
lowers the incentive problem on projects that continue to be funded. The cost is that
rationing arises, so some positive net surplus projects are now unfunded. When the supply
of funds is totally inelastic, there is no such cost, and a welfare improvement is guaranteed.
Outside of these cases, the condition is obviously more likely to be satisfied if the
elasticity of funds’ supply, enI, is small. Further analysis of (11) shows that a usury law is
more likely to be beneficial when the net surplus of projects is low, since then the cost of
                                                
7 Expressed in terms of number of fixed-size loans.
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having projects unfounded through rationing is low, and also if success probabilities are very
sensitive to effort since then moral hazard effects are high.
4. Heterogeneous entrepreneurs.
The case for usury laws is strengthened when we relax the assumption that
entrepreneurs are all endowed with the same project. Suppose entrepreneurs (i.e. projects)
are heterogeneous but the bank is perfectly able to discriminate among them. The marginal
project funded in a market-clearing equilibrium pays the highest interest rate of all but
contributes zero private and social surplus. Introduction of a just binding usury law causes
exit of the marginal entrepreneur, which of itself causes no aggregate loss but, due to the
lower demand for funds, it implies lower interest rates for the infra-marginal entrepreneurs.
Moral hazard is therefore reduced, and a net gain emerges even in a market clearing case
with elastic supply of funds.
To illustrate, suppose each entrepreneur has access to a project with a two-point
return distribution. In the event of success entrepreneur i  generates revenue Si and failure
yields zero revenue for all types. To activate the project requires a fixed amount of capital,
K. All entrepreneurs are endowed with wealth W, which is insufficient to cover the whole
cost of the project and therefore an amount L, must be borrowed to proceed.
Entrepreneurs can be unambiguously ranked in terms of ability. In the event of success the
return differs across projects, with Sj>Sj+1. As in Section 3, entrepreneurs can increase the
probability of success, p, by exerting unobservable effort, e. The function relating the
success probability to effort, p(e),  is the same across all projects. Risk-neutral banks
engage in Bertrand competition and are fully informed of every loan applicant’s type. As a
result, banks offer tailored contracts (i.e. repayments, Di) to each entrepreneur which
generate expected revenue equal to the cost of funds, pDi=I(n), where I(n) is the inverse
supply of funds as a function of the number of projects to be funded.
 The expected utility of entrepreneur i  is
Ui = p(ei )(Si - Di) - ei  (12),
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Substituting Di = I pi  in the FOC (2), it follows that:
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which is positive under the standard assumption that returns to effort are positive and
decreasing. The intuition here is that as better entrepreneurs gain a larger return in the event
of success, they have more incentive to apply effort and, in equilibrium, enjoy a higher
success probability.
Proposition 3. When projects’ quality is heterogeneous but public knowledge, and
there exists moral hazard, a just binding usury law always increases a utilitarian
welfare function under market clearing.
Proof. In market clearing equilibrium let the best n entrepreneurs be funded with associated
contracts Di=
I n
pi
( )
, for i=1,….n. By definition of a market clearing equilibrium, the
participation constraint of the marginal entrepreneur, n, is just binding.  
 pn(Sn-Dn)-(1+r)W-e=0                         
(14).
The banks’ profit on a loan to n is
pn= pnDn-I(n)=0 (15).
Note that (14) and (15) together imply that the marginal project actually produces no
surplus at all. Finally, recall that the interest factor on loans is inversely related to the
project’s quality. Hence Dn must be the largest repayment observed in the market. Suppose
that a usury law is imposed forbidding repayments above Dm such that
 Dn-1<Dm<Dn. The regulation drives (only) the marginal entrepreneur out of the market. By
(14) the expelled entrepreneur is no worse-off. Nor, considering (14) and (15) jointly, does
aggregate social surplus decreases because of his exit. However, the interest rate on funds
must decrease as fewer projects (n-1) are undertaken, the new repayment on deposits
being I(n-1)<I(n). As a consequence, the repayment on each loan (i=1,…,n-1) must
decrease:
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 There is a redistribution of surplus from depositors to borrowers. More
interestingly, the lower repayment dampens the moral-hazard effect on all infra-marginal
projects, as 
de
dD
*
< 0 . So, the exclusion of the marginal entrepreneur, which causes no
direct loss of social surplus, means banks set lower repayments for all other entrepreneurs.
This in turn increases each entrepreneur’s incentive to supply effort, and the net expected
surplus generated by each funded project also rises. Hence a net gain emerges from the
imposition of the usury law. QED.
This result extends Proposition 2 to all instances in which the elasticity of supply of
funds is strictly positive. The key point is that a just-binding usury law now has no rationing
cost because the marginal project is zero private and social surplus.
Notice how the merits of a (finite) usury law compare to those of a (finite) interest
rate subsidy. As long as funds are not in totally inelastic supply, the subsidy is to some
extent passed on to existing borrowers, so eliminates some of the deadweight cost of moral
hazard. Even ignoring the problem of raising the required revenue, the drawback of the
subsidy is that it attracts entrepreneurs with negative expected value projects, whereas the
usury law limits moral hazard at the cost of expelling good projects. It is thus optimal to
combine the two policies.
5. Usury laws in costly-state-verification and diversionary models.
A similar case for usury laws emerges when bankruptcy there involves dissipative
costs. Such is the case with costly-state-verification models. Also, transferring the assets of
a defaulting firm may involve several varieties of deadweight cost. It is reasonable to assume
that the owner of the firm  generally better manages these assets than would the lending
institution. Moreover, fire sales necessarily involve a discount on the ‘true’ value of the
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assets themselves.8 Whenever such costs exist and the lending institution is unable to
observe the realization of the borrowers’ project, inefficient liquidation occurs in equilibrium
(Townsend, 1978, Diamond, 1984, and Gale and Hellwig, 1985). Under certain conditions,
rationing may take place as well (Williamson, 1986). A usury law may decrease the amount
of inefficient liquidation that occurs in both rationing and market clearing regimes. As in the
cases in the previous sections, this effect has to be balanced with potential losses from
decreased depositors’ welfare and funds’ availability. We will consider the rationing case
first and show that Proposition 1 applies also in this environment.
 Consider a population of N identical entrepreneurs each endowed with the same
investment project yielding stochastic return R. The expected return is
ò=
p
dRRRfS
0
)( (17),
where f(.) is the pdf of the projects’ return. If D is the borrower’s stipulated repayment, and
transfer of the assets to the bank involves a loss proportional in the assets’ value of c<1,
then the expected return to the bank may reach a maximum when there exists a D* such
that
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In this case rationing occurs at D* if the supply of deposits at I=M(D*) is less than the
number of entrepreneurs. In assessing the effect of a marginal change in the repayment,
because of the envelope theorem argument used in Section 3, a marginal decrease in the
lending rate has no effect on depositors’ welfare or on the availability of funds. The only
relevant consideration concerns the entrepreneurs’ welfare. Given unchanged availability of
funds, entrepreneurs’ welfare must be decreasing in the repayment, D. Once again, a usury
law improves on the market equilibrium at the margin. Figure 1 represents the situation and
the welfare-maximizing repayment must be strictly lower than the free-market-equilibrium
repayment for any well behaved social-welfare function.
                                                
8 This may be due to a ‘lemons’ problem or because the next best-user of the asset faces a similar adverse shock as
the defaulting business (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 and Kyotaki and Moore, 1997)
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In the market clearing case we need to consider changes in the welfare of both
borrowers and depositors.
Proposition 4: When there exists a dissipative cost from defaulting and the equilibrium
entails market clearing, a usury law always increases a utilitarian social welfare
function  if  the supply of deposits is inelastic.
Proof. We wish to analyse the case in which no rationing occurs and therefore all N
entrepreneurs are served in the unregulated equilibrium with debt repayment D*. When a
usury law is implemented, entrepreneurs’ welfare is affected through the effect on the
expected return and also through the possibility of being rationed. Depositors’ welfare
change can be evaluated remembering that, at the margin, it equals the change in banks’
revenues. Then
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where n£N is the number of loans that is granted. A usury law is welfare improving when
(19) is negative. Note that, as in Section 3, the second (positive) term on the RHS of (19) is
zero whenever the slope of the supply of funds (dn/dI) is zero. QED.
From  (19), the condition for a welfare gain is more likely to be satisfied if the
banks’ return is not very responsive to the repayment, if the bankruptcy cost is relatively
high, and if the probability of default is high.
A dissipative cost may also emerge in connection with entrepreneurs’ ability to
‘divert’ (part of) the return from the project (Barro, 1976, Black and de Meza, 1992, Hart,
1995). Depending on the realization of the return and on an exogenous cost of default
(reputation loss, inability to borrow further, social stigma, etc.), entrepreneurs may find it
advantageous to divert the return to their private uses and default even when repayment
could be actually met. In the diversion process it appears reasonable to assume that some
part of the surplus will be lost. Suppose this loss amounts to a proportion of the return, a..
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Increasing repayment will have an adverse incentive effect and therefore rationing may occur
in this setting as well (see for example Black and de Meza, (1992)9). If entrepreneurs differ
in their costs of defaulting, c, with pdf f(c), for any repayment there exist a threshold, c*,
such that default occurs if10
c*<D-R(1-a) (20).
If c is private information, then even when project return is non-stochastic, the
banks’ return may attain a maximum. This occurs at D* if
dM
dD
= f (c)dc
c *
c
ò - D * f (D *- R(1 -a)) = 0 (21).
Decreasing the repayment is again necessarily welfare improving as it involves less
aggregate diversion of funds and associated deadweight cost. As in the costly-state-
verification model, a just binding usury law implies no change in the banks’ return, no loss in
depositors’ welfare, and no variation in the availability of funds. Borrowers do though gain
from the lower interest rate. In the market clearing case, the banks’ expected return and the
availability of funds are affected by a change in the repayment. Therefore, a welfare
improvement occurs only if the gains from less diversion on remaining projects compensates
for the loss of positive value projects due to the rationing induced.
Note that in this model there are two possible sources of gain from a usury ceiling;
the reduced costs of diversion and the saving of default costs. With some extension, this
model provides a possible underpinning for Adam Smith’s support of usury laws. Suppose
that the ‘projectors’ mentioned are simply entrepreneurs with a relatively low aversion to
default. Also, allow project returns to be stochastic so there may now be a cut off c above
which entrepreneurs do not seek loans. Amongst those who do borrow, entrepreneurs with
low c default in more states. A usury law now lowers the probability of default by any given
entrepreneur and so saves deadweight costs. In addition there is a composition effect. Low
c entrepreneurs are now induced to apply for loans when previously they did not do so. The
average c of funded entrepreneurs must therefore rise. It is ambiguous whether this is
socially desirable. High c means less default and associated costs, but if default does occur,
                                                
9 The formulation here is slightly different.
10 We assume that R-D>0 so irrespective of their c, all entrepreneurs seek loans.
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it is more costly. Assuming the former effect dominates, Smith was right in wanting to
eliminate “projectors” and a usury law will be helpful.
6. Excess optimism.
Adam Smith (1776) noted that most people have an inflated view of their own
abilities and life chances.
“The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own
abilities is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages.
Their absurd presumption in their good fortune has been less taken notice of. It is,
however, if possible still more universal.”
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
Recent empirical investigation by psychologists, massively confirm Smith’s insight into
human nature (for a survey see De Bondt and Thaler, 1995). Of particular relevance here,
Arabsheibani et al. (2000) find evidence not only that entrepreneurs are excessively
optimistic, but also that, as a class, they are significantly more optimistic than employees. On
the basis of such evidence, theorists have explained some important empirical regularities in
the credit markets.11
Excess optimism provides a simple argument for usury law. When some
entrepreneurs have biased expectations about their projects’ profitability, they may be
willing, other things equal, to pay very high interest rates. Assuming banks, as outsiders with
considerable experience of dashed expectations, are more realistic in their evaluations than
individual entrepreneurs, the highest borrowing rates in the market will be paid by optimists
endowed with low quality projects. Under these conditions, a usury law forbidding the
highest interest rates pushes out of the market entrepreneurs who are more likely to be
                                                
11 In particular Chan and Kanatas (1985) explain why the use of collateral may be preferred to high interest rate. de
Meza and Southey (1996) use over-optimism to explain the high rate of default on start-ups, the use of debt and
the correlation between project risk and collateral. Manove and Padilla (1999) argue for bankruptcy exemptions
and general limitations on the rights of lenders to repossess collateral on the ground that these limitations encourage
banks to actively screen sober entrepreneurs from over-optimistic ones.
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over-optimistic and whose projects tend to be negative expected value when objectively
assessed.
To illustrate formally the idea we will suppose that there exists equal numbers of
each of two types of entrepreneurs; realists and over-optimists. Each entrepreneur owns an
investment project. All projects have two possible outcomes, S in case of success and zero
otherwise. Projects differ only in their success probability, p with support p,  p( ). While
realists correctly estimate their chances of success, over-optimists upgrade the true chance
by a factor l (>1).12 Note that these assumptions imply that the intrinsic project quality of
the two classes of entrepreneurs is not systematically different13. Each project requires a
fixed amount of capital, K. Entrepreneurs do not possess wealth and therefore are
compelled to search for external finance.  Implementing the project also involves
entrepreneurs exerting to a fixed level of effort, e. As returns are non-verifiable ex-post, as
before bank loans are the only viable finance instrument. If D is the repayment, the expected
utility from undertaking the project is
Ur=p(S-D)-e (22),
Uo=lp(S-D)-e (22’),
respectively for realists and optimist. For each type, participation (Ur³0, Uo³0) depends on
the quality of the project and bank repayment. For optimists, however, it depends also on
the extent to which they overestimate their chances of success, l.
Banks are competitive and are perfectly able to discriminate entrepreneurs. As a
consequence, each entrepreneur will be offered a ‘fair’ repayment sufficient to cover the
cost of funds.  We initially assume, that the market supply of funds is perfectly elastic  with I
being the repayment due to depositors on a loan sufficient to fund a project. Banks have no
                                                
12 With lp < 1 .
13 It could be argued that entrepreneurs’ ability to assess the quality of their projects should be correlated with
their overall entrepreneurial ability and hence with the quality of their projects itself. For example an entrepreneur
able to formulate correct expectations should also be able to take better decisions during the execution of his
project. This would reinforce our result. Another possibility is that entrepreneurs may overestimate the size of the
success payoff. If effort were a continuous variable optimists would work harder in some formulations, a force
tending to make them low interest rate borrowers.
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operating costs so the repayment required of a project with success probability pI, is
Di=
I
pi
.
Proposition 5. When some entrepreneurs display excessive optimism, an appropriate
usury law increases aggregate  expected  income  even when the supply of funds is
perfectly  elastic.
In order to assess the effects of a usury law we will look at marginal entrepreneurs.
The participation constraints (PC) for realistic (i) and optimistic (j) entrepreneurs can be
written;
pi ³
e
S - Di
(23),
p j ³
e
l S - Dj( )
(23’),
For the marginal entrepreneur in each group, the PC holds as an equality. Denote with pi
and pj, their respective success probabilities and by Di and Dj, the repayments they face.
Then ,
( )
( )
( )
( )
l =
-
-
=
-
-
>
p
p
p
p
i
j
i
j
S D
S D
S I
S I
i
j 1  (24)
 14.
from which it follows that pi>pj, and therefore, Di<Dj. This implies that the highest
repayment in the market will be Dj. Suppose that a usury law forbidding any repayment
larger or equal than Dj is now introduced. The optimistic entrepreneur with success
probability pj cannot now be funded. Note however that, substituting for Dj , it follows from
the participation constraint (23’) that the net social surplus from this project is negative when
evaluated at the objective success probability. Hence, an interest rate cap, by preventing
project j  from being undertaken, increases surplus. QED.
The intuition is straightforward. The marginal optimistic entrepreneur executes
his/her project even if its net surplus is negative because of biased expectations. Due to the
                                                
14 Using (23) and (23’).
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low quality of the project, the interest rate charged is the highest among participating
entrepreneurs. Forbidding this interest rate precludes the funding of the project and
increases welfare. The gain accrues entirely to the excluded entrepreneur. There is scope to
debate whether it is appropriate to “overrule” the entrepreneur’s own judgement even in the
light of evidence of systematic errors. There are obvious arguments on both sides of this
question.
 Accepting that ex post evaluation is appropriate, the exclusion of any optimist
entrepreneur willing to accept a debt contract with a repayment larger than Di, is beneficial
so the optimal interest rate ceiling must be Di.
The argument is strengthened if the supply of funds is not perfectly elastic. The cost
of funds for each project is now a function of the number of projects funded so I(n).
Participation constraints are still defined by (23), (23’) hence the marginal optimist is carries
out a negative-expected-surplus project in the unregulated equilibrium and should be
excluded.  In addition, when the interest rate ceiling is imposed, the interest rate on deposits
drops as a consequence of the exit of  optimistic entrepreneurs so the repayments set to
other must drop. Additional realists will enter the market and realize their projects. The
partial substitution of optimistic entrepreneurs by realists involves a substitution of negative-
surplus projects by positive-surplus ones.
These results also obtain in a more general setting allowing for a continuum of
psychological attitudes (optimism-pessimists). Suppose, as above, that projects are
differentiated only in their success probability, and that p is continuously distributed with
support p, p( ) and let each entrepreneur’s evaluation of his/her success probability be
biased by a factor li. wherel is distributed with support l,l( ). Finally, p and l are
independently distributed. The space of projects and psychological attitudes is represented
by the box in Figure 2.
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Figure 2.
No further special assumption is made about the distribution of psychological attitudes
among entrepreneurs and the supply of deposit is assumed perfectly elastic at a repayment
I. Given the assumption that banks possess full information, each entrepreneur is again
offered an actuarially fair contract, the repayment being based on the break even condition:
piDi=I. Participation for entrepreneur i requires that:
li pi(S-Di)-e ³ 0 (25).
From (25),  the participation constraint (PC) locus shown in Figure 2 is
IpS
e
)DS(p
e
-
=
-
=l (26).
Consider now the entrepreneur on the top point on the PC locus, H. His probability
of success, p*, is the lowest in the pool of participating entrepreneurs. If we denote by D*
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(D*: p*D*=I), the repayment required from the bank, this repayment will be the largest any
bank charges. His participation constraint holds as an equality, and hence
lp S D e*( *)- - = 0  (27).
Since l>1, the expected project surplus must be negative. Therefore a usury law
constraining the repayment strictly below D* and preventing this project from being realized,
must increase welfare. By the same argument, all projects in the shaded area in Figure 2, for
which p<pr, where pr is the probability of success of the realist entrepreneur on the PC
locus, are negative-present-value projects. Denote by Dr the repayment associated with a
project with success probability pr, then welfare is maximized when a usury law forbidding
repayments above Dr is imposed.
Also in this case the argument can be favourably be extended to a setting in which
the supply of funds is elastic to the interest factor. Suppose the supply of funds, expressed in
terms of number of loans, is ns(I). The participation constraint and the PC locus can be
written again like [25] and [26] above, but in this case they depend on the number of loans
because of the cost of funds, I(n). The unconstrained equilibrium entails market clearing.
Suppose the number of entrepreneurs served is n* and that PC in Figure 3 is the
participation constraint locus when n* entrepreneurs are served.
When a binding usury ceiling, Du is implemented, some entrepreneurs cannot be
served. The forced exit of these entrepreneurs however decreases the volume of lending so
the cost of deposits also falls. As a consequence, the repayment required of each
entrepreneur in equilibrium, decreases. More entrepreneurs are now willing to borrow funds
and the participation constraint locus shifts downwards to PC’ in Figure 3. To assess
qualitatively the effects of the usury ceiling we will compare the pre- and post-ceiling
situation in the Figure. In the constrained equilibrium, entrepreneurs in the area HOM cannot
obtain funds any more. These were the worst entrepreneurs served in the unconstrained
equilibrium. Their participation was driven by over-optimistic expectations. As a
consequence of their exit, some on average more realistic entrepreneurs, unwilling to
participate in the unconstrained equilibrium because of the high cost of funds, are now
served in the constrained equilibrium (those in zone MNN’M’).
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Figure 3
 The exit of entrepreneurs in the area HOM yields a direct welfare gain as their projects
deliver negative expected net-present value. The substitution of low-quality optimists by
high-quality pessimists is only partial. The number of entrepreneurs entering the market
following the implementation of the ceiling must necessarily be lower than the number of
excluded entrepreneurs. This follows because the fall in the cost of funds only occurs  if the
overall volume of lending decreases.
This then is a plausible key to Adam Smith’s surprising support for usury laws.
Overoptimistic entrepreneurs, willing to pay high interest rates, cause the interest rate on
deposits to rise so high that ‘sober’ (i.e. realistic or even pessimistic) entrepreneurs do not
demand loans. A usury ceiling, by preventing loans to the optimists, decreases the overall
cost of funds and induces the substitution of better for worse projects.
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7. Conclusion.
Usury laws may be welfare enhancing in a variety of circumstances. When moral
hazard causes equilibrium credit rationing, an appropriate usury law must increase welfare,
while in the market-clearing regime, an improvement definitely occurs if the supply of funds
is inelastic. When entrepreneurial heterogeneity is introduced, an unambiguous improvement
emerges whenever funds are not in perfectly elastically supply. Variants of the basic moral-
hazard model in which usury laws may also be beneficial are when the bank can verify the
entrepreneur's return only at a cost, and when entrepreneurs can divert part of the project
return to their private uses. Nevertheless,  usury laws are not always helpful when credit
markets are subject to asymmetric information. Hidden types, whether in the Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) or the de Meza and Webb (1987) form, preclude gains from usury laws. In
the first case entrepreneurs' return distributions differ by mean preserving spreads. An
effective usury law would then increase or introduce rationing and the volume of lending
would decrease. The average riskiness of loan applicants falls but as all projects have the
same expected return, this is of no welfare significance. In the second case, entrpreneurs'
returns can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance and the credit market always
clears, As in the conventional demand and supply analysis, a usury law creates rationing and
diminishes lending. Although under laissez faire equilibrium involves overlending, the usury
law is not helpful because it is a random selection of borrowers that is excluded rather than
those of negative present value. In fact, the consequences are worse still, for at the lower
interest rate, the average quality of the pool of loan applicants deteriorates. The average
surplus per loan and the number of loans falls. Both hidden types formulations therefore
cause total welfare to decreases. Usury laws may therefore be appropriate for markets
where screening is unnecessary or easily accomplished, but hidden action is difficult to
control (for example, through collateral provision or procedures for recovering bad loans).
This may possibly explain why usury laws are often directed to consumer loans.
Finally, we noted that entrepreneurs tend to be unrealistically optimistic and those
willing to pay the highest interest rate will, on average, be the most biased of all. Hence, a
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lower interest rate may improve the intrinsic quality of the pool of loan applicants. As long
as the supply of funds is not perfectly elastic, a usury law may therefore be beneficial in
redirecting funds from the negative present value projects of unrealistic optimists to the
positive present value projects of more realistic entrepreneurs. This appears to be the basis
of Smith's advocacy of a usury law. This shrewd observer of human nature would have
known of the irrational exuberance stirred up in the South Sea Bubble episode in England
and the similar frenzy in France surrounding  his compatriot, John Law's, Mississipi
Company. Smith's case cannot be dismissed out of hand. Not even today.
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